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Objective: To test the effect of misinformation outside of the laboratory and to explore correlates of the effect,
including arousal, cognitive ability, and neuroticism.
Method: About 2 months before deployment to Afghanistan, 249 soldiers enrolled in this study, which was
embedded in a larger project. Two months after deployment, participants were interviewed about stressors on
deployment and they received subtle misinformation about a fictional event on deployment. Seven months
later, they were retested, and completed a questionnaire about events on deployment.
Results: At 9 months, a total of 26% of participants reported that they had experienced the fictional event,
although 7 months earlier they said they had not experienced it. Logistic regression analyses revealed that
lower cognitive ability and a combination of high arousal and more stressors on deployment were related to
higher susceptibility to the misinformation effect.
Conclusions: Results suggest that information provided by another source may be incorporated into related
autobiographical memory, particularly for individuals with lower cognitive ability, high arousal at the time of
encoding the information and more related experiences.
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H
ow often do you answer the question ‘‘How do
you know?’’ with ‘‘Because I remember’’? We
rely on memory every day and may assume that
it is veridical, especially when memories are vivid and
detailed. However, memory is malleable, and this was
clearly demonstrated by Loftus and Palmer’s (1974)
classic study about the effects of suggestive questions
on eyewitness reports. In this study, participants were
shown a film about a car accident. Then some of them
were asked to estimate the speed of the cars when they
‘‘smashed’’ into each other, whereas others received the
same question in which the word ‘‘smashed’’ had been
replaced by ‘‘hit’’. The ‘‘smashed’’ group made higher
speed estimates than the ‘‘hit’’ group, and was more likely
to report 1 week later that they had seen broken glass
in the film, even though no broken glass had been shown.
In another study by Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978),
participants were shown a series of pictures about an
auto-pedestrian accident, including a picture with a red
Datsun at a stop sign for half of the group, and with a
yield sign for the other half of the group. Then both
groups were asked ‘‘Did another car pass the red Datsun
while it was stopped at the yield sign?’’. In a subsequent
memory task that involved a forced choice between the
picture of the yield sign and the stop sign, fewer misled
participants were accurate than participants who had
received consistent information (41 and 71%, respec-
tively). This study showed that new, incorrect information
about a previously experienced event can change the
way people remember that event. This ‘‘misinformation’’
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psychology (see Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2006).
Numerous studies have replicated and extended these
findings, varying from misinformation that alters aspects
of the original memory (e.g., remembering a hammer as
a screwdriver or remembering a non-existing barn along
a country road; Loftus, 1975; McCloskey & Zaragoza,
1985) to the creation of entire events (e.g., being lost in a
mall; e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Studies have even
shown that implausible events may be ‘‘remembered’’
after exposure to misleading information (e.g., witness-
ing demonic possession, being abducted by an UFO;
Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Otgaar, Candel,
Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009).
A reviewed subset of studies suggests that, on average,
about 31% of participants create memories that incorpo-
rate the misinformation (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, &
Garry, 2004). Hyman and Loftus (1998) described three
processes that are critically involved in the creation of
such false memories. First, the new information needs
to be perceived as plausible, which can be achieved by
simple interventions. For instance, Mazzoni et al. (2001)
showed that merely reading mini-articles about the high
frequency of an implausible event (like witnessing de-
monic possession) increased participants’ ratings of
plausibility and likelihood that they had experienced
this event. Second, the new information should be
visualized. Vivid images with great sensory and percep-
tual details are more prone to be (falsely) labelled as
memories for actual events (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001;
Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003). Third, a source
memory error should occur. This concerns the attribution
of the memory’s origin to an incorrect source (e.g., to a
personal experience, rather than other people, television,
or a newspaper; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
Only a few studies so far have tested the misinforma-
tion effect outside of the laboratory, but these focused
on short-term effects. For example, Crombag, Wagenaar,
and van Koppen (1996) asked participants about
details of a tragedy that took place on October 4, 1992,
when an airplane crashed in an apartment building in
Amsterdam. The crash received a lot of media coverage
in the Netherlands, which included reports of eyewit-
nesses and videos of the aftermath. Although no video
material of the actual crash existed, more than half of the
participants said they had seen the video of this moment
and a substantial part even ‘‘remembered’’ details about
how the plane hit the building and what happened next.
Crombag et al. (1996) suggested that dramatic events may
be more vulnerable for the misinformation effect than
ordinary events, because of their ability to evoke vivid
images that interfere with source monitoring.
A recent study by Zhu et al. (2012) tested whether
misinformation effects may persist for long periods of
time. They showed participants a series of pictures of
events (e.g., a picture of a man who puts his wallet in his
jacket’s outside pocket as part of the series about a girl
whose wallet is being stolen). The pictures were followed
by narratives that described the events of the pictures;
some included accurate information, others included
misinformation (e.g., the man put his wallet in his pants’
pocket). In a recognition task, questions were asked about
the event in the picture (e.g., where did the man put
his wallet?). Results indicated that the misinformation
provided in the narrative was incorporated in the memory
for the picture. About 1.5 years later, participants were
retested and some still showed the misinformation effect.
However, this was a laboratory study, and it remains
unknown whether the effect persists in the long run
outside of the laboratory.
Another issue that remains unclear is which individual
characteristics increase susceptibility to the misinfor-
mation effect. A likely candidate is arousal at time of
encoding of the misinformation, because it is enhances
memory storage (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). Therefore,
heightened arousal may increase the likelihood that new
information is stored and later remembered. With respect
to more stable individual differences, studies have found
that cognitive ability is negatively correlated with prone-
nesstoincorporatemisinformationintoexistingmemories
(Gudjonsson,1983;Singh&Gudjonsson,1992;Zhuetal.,
2010a), although other studies have failed to find this
correlation (Powers,Andriks, & Loftus, 1979; Salthouse &
Siedlecki, 2007). There is also evidence that neuroticism is
positivelycorrelatedwith susceptibility to the misinforma-
tion effect (Gudjonsson, 1983; Liebman et al., 2002).
However, a recent study showed that harm avoidance,
which is associatedwith neuroticism, correlated negatively
with susceptibility to the misinformation effect (Zhu et al.,
2010b). To examine the independent predictive value of
these variables, they should be included in one study.
The aim of the current study was to test the long-term
effect of subtle misinformation outside of the laboratory,
and to explore several potential predictors. Since the
misinformation effect depends on plausibility, we decided
to examine this issue in a convenience sample of Dutch
soldiers who had been deployed to Afghanistan, and had
been exposed to similar events there. The misinforma-
tion related to a fictional deployment-related stressor.
Participants were tested in a larger prospective project
about vulnerabilityandresiliencefactors in risk for PTSD.
They were tested about 2 months before deployment (pre-
test), and, again about 2 months after returning home
(post-test).Atthepost-test,theyreceivedaninterviewthat
included questions about exposure to stressors on deploy-
ment. At the end, they were given misinformation about
an event that had not occurred during their deployment,
but which seemed plausible. It involved abrief description
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Year’s Eve. Participants were merely asked whether they
had been exposed to such an event during their deploy-
ment. About 7 months later (follow-up), participantswere
asked to complete a questionnaire with items that referred
to deployment-related stressors. For each stressor, parti-
cipants indicatedwhether they had or had not experienced
it during their deployment. One item referred to a missile
attack on New Year’s Eve. Potential predictors of the
misinformation effect were arousal, cognitive ability, and
neuroticism. It may be speculated that soldiers with more
stressorsondeploymentwerebetterabletoconstructvivid
images related to the misinformation and found it more
plausible. Therefore, the interaction between stressors on
deployment and arousal was also included as a potential
predictor.
It was predicted that a substantial minority of the
participants would show the misinformation effect at
the follow-up (i.e., they would report having experienced
the missile attack on New Year’s evening). It was also
predicted that arousal, the number of deployment-related
stressors, the interaction between arousal and stressors,
cognitive ability, and neuroticism would be associated
with the misinformation effect.
Method
Participants and procedure
Participants included 249 Dutch Royal Army soldiers
(98%male,meanage 23.8years,SD 4.9),whoenrolled
in a prospective study about PTSD before their 4-month
deployment to Afghanistan in 2010 (see Lommen, En-
gelhard, Sijbrandij, van den Hout, & Hermans, 2013). For
most participants the highest attained educational level
was secondary school (92%), but for some it was primary
school (2%) or college/university (6%). About 34% of
participants of this sample were married or cohabiting,
38% were in a relationship but not cohabiting, and 28%
were single. About 43% had not been deployed before.
At the pre-test, participants completed the question-
naire about neuroticism. At the post-test, 247 partici-
pants (99%) were retested, and received an interview
that included assessment of deployment-related stressors.
After that, participants were given subtle misinformation
about a missile attack at the base on New Year’s Eve.
Questionnaires measuring PTSD symptom severity
during the past month and exposure to stressors on
deployment were also administered. At the follow-up test,
221 participants (89%) completed the deployment stres-
sor questionnaire again, to which an item about the
missile attack on New Year’s Even was now added. A
total of 181 participants also completed the cognitive
ability test. Non-response was partly due to participants
who were unreachable after a transfer, or withdrew from
the study.
For recruitment details see Lommen et al. (2013).
Participation was voluntary without financial compensa-
tion. Participants provided oral and written informed
consent at the pre-test and again at the post-test. The
Medical Ethical Committee of Maastricht University
approved this study.
Measures
PTSD symptom severity was assessed with the Dutch
version (Engelhard, Arntz, & van den Hout, 2007) of the
Posttraumatic Symptom Scale*Self Report (PSS; Foa,
Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). Participants were
asked to rate the 17 DSM-IV PTSD symptoms on a
0( not at all)t o3( almost always) scale for the prior month,
with respect to the deployment-related event(s) that
troubled them the most. The sum score of the hypera-
rousal subscale (PSS-H; 5 items) was used. Cronbach’s
alpha at the post-test was .81 for the total scale, and .54,
.72, and .68 for the subscales (re-experiencing, avoidance,
and hyperarousal, respectively). The PSS is a valid and
reliable measure (Engelhard et al., 2007; Foa et al., 1993).
Stressful events were assessed with the Dutch version
(Engelhard & van den Hout, 2007) of the Potentially
Traumatizing Events Scale (PTES; Maguen, Litz, Wang,
& Cook, 2004). To adjust the scale to deployment to
Afghanistan, one of the original 21 items that represent
war-zone related stressors, was omitted (‘‘patrolling areas
where there were land mines’’), and four were added
(‘‘Having injured civilians due to own action’’ and ‘‘being
formally told that a colleague got killed’’; Engelhard &
van den Hout, 2007, ‘‘seeing dead or injured Afghan
soldiers or police’’, and ‘‘conflict situation with Afghan
police’’). Another item was adjusted to the situation in
Afghanistan (‘‘patrolling through the zone of separation’’
was changed to ‘‘stand guard during patrol’’). For each
of the 24 stressors, participants indicated whether or
not they had experienced it on their deployment to
Afghanistan. The number of endorsed stressors was
used (range 0 24).
Cognitive ability was assessed with the Standard Pro-
gressive Matrices (Raven, 1976), which is an abstract rea-
soning task that consists of 60 multiple-choice items. The
number of correct answers was computed (range 0 60).
Neuroticism was assessed with the Dutch version
(Sanderman, Arrindell, Ranchor, Eysenck, & Eysenck,
1991) of the neuroticism scale of the Eysenck Personal-
ity Questionnaire*short version (EPQ-N; Eysenck, &
Eysenck, 1975). This widely-used scale consists of 22
items that can be answered with yes ( 1) or no ( 0).
The sum score was used. Psychometric properties of this
scale are good (Sanderman et al., 1991).
Misinformation effect
Citation: European Journal of Psychotraumatology 2013, 4: 19864 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v4i0.19864 3
(page number not for citation purpose)Misinformation effect
At the post-test, participants were provided new informa-
tion about an event that did not take place during their
deployment, that is, a (harmless) missile attack at the
base on New Year’s Eve. We provided a short description
of the event including some sensory details (e.g., sound of
explosion, sight of gravel after the explosion). After that,
participants were asked if they had experienced a missile
attack on New Year’s Eve during their deployment to
Afghanistan. At follow-up, ‘‘Missile attackon New Year’s
Eve’’ was added to the PTES. The misinformation effect
was considered as present if participants indicated they
had experienced the missile attack on New Year’s Eve.
Statistical analysis
The Raven score was not normally distributed. Therefore,
the scores of four outliers were replaced by M-2.5 SD to
obtain a normal distribution. Furthermore, eight parti-
cipants reported that they had experienced the fictional
event at the post-test and were excluded from the
analyses. To explore factors that may contribute to the
misinformation effect susceptibility, Pearson correla-
tions were computed between arousal (PSS-H), stressors
(PTES), cognitive ability (Raven), neuroticism (EPQ-N)
and the misinformation effect. Then a logistic regres-
sion analysis was run, with the misinformation effect
as dependent variable. The PSS-H PTES interaction
and those variables that correlated significantly with the
misinformation effect were centered and included as
independent variables.
Results
Non-response analysis
There were no differences regarding scores on EPQ-N at
pre-test, PTES at post-test, or PSS-H at post-test between
participants who completed the Raven, largest t 1.41,
p .16, and those who have not, or between responders
and non-responders at follow-up, largest t .76, p .45,
which suggested an absence of selection bias.
Misinformation effect
A total of 213 participants received the misinformation
at the post-test and indicated they had not experienced
this event during their deployment. Seven months later,
55 (26%) reported that they had experienced this event
on their deployment. More soldiers who had not been
deployed before showed the misinformation effect (n 30),
compared to soldiers who had been deployed before
(n  25), x
2 4.30, df 1, p .04.
Susceptibility to the misinformation effect
Correlations (Table 1) showed that the misinformation
effect was positively associated with the PTES and nega-
tively associated with the Raven, but not associated with
the PSS-H and EPQ-N. The multiple logistic regression
analysis showed that the PSS-H PTES interaction
1 and
Raven were significant predictors of the misinforma-
tion effect, but prior deployment was not (p .05). The
model including only the significant predictors (Table 2)
showed good fit according to the Hosmer and Lemeshow
Goodness-of-fit test, x
2 2.79, df 8, p .95. According
to the Box-Tidwell approach, the assumption of linearity
of logits was not violated, smallest p .11. The explained
variance by the tested model ranged from 12% (Cox &
Snell R
2 and McFadden R
2) to 18% (Nagelkerke R
2).
With respect to the Raven, with each point of increase
on the Raven test, the logit of the misinformation effect
decreased with .10. In terms of odds, the chance on the
misinformation effect decreasedwith a factor of 0.91 (9%)
with each point of increase on the Raven.
Figure 1 shows the PSS-H PTES interaction effect,
with separate lines for the PSS-H percentiles 5, 25, 50, 75,
and 95 and the mean Raven score. Percentile 5 represents
the 5% with the lowest scores on the PSS-H; percentile 95
represents the 5% highest scores on the PSS-H. The figure
shows that the probability of the misinformation effect
for low PSS-H scores was hardly affected by PTES scores.
In contrast, the probability of the misinformation effect
in high PSS-H scores depended on PTES scores, with
higher scores on both variables resulting in the highest
probability scores. In other words, probability of the mis-
information effect increased with the number of stressors
when arousal was high, but the number of stressors did
hardly influence the probability of the misinformation
effect when arousal was low.
Discussion
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, as
hypothesized, a substantial minority of soldiers (26%)
reported that they had experienced the fictional missile
attack on New Year’s Eve during their deployment,
about 7 months after they received information about
this event. None of them had indicated 2 months after
deployment that they had experienced this event. This
finding is in line with the mean percentage of participants
showing the misinformation effect in a reviewed subset
of studies (31%; Lindsay et al., 2004). The current study
extends these prior findings to a longer period (i.e., about
7 months). Second, susceptibility to the misinformation
effect was related to the interaction between arousal and
the number of stressors on deployment, and to lower
cognitive ability. Susceptibility was relatively low when
arousal was high and the number of deployment-related
stressors was low, but susceptibility increased when both
1To rule out that the interaction effect was driven by PTSD
symptoms instead of arousal, the analysis was reran with the other
PTSD symptom clusters (re-experiencing and avoidance), which
revealed non-significant interactions.
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this interaction be explained? Arousal at time of encoding
enhances memory (e.g., Cahill & McGaugh, 1998), and
the number of experienced stressors may influence the
ease with which related misinformation evokes vivid
images, and may affect the perceived plausibility. There-
fore, new information may not be remembered if arousal
at the time of encoding is low, independently of the
plausibility and visual processing of the information.
However, when arousal is high, the misinformation may
be remembered, particularly if it is plausible and evokes
vivid images. Results concerning the association between
lower cognitive ability and susceptibility to the misinfor-
mation effect replicate earlier findings (Gudjonsson,
1983; Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992; Zhu et al., 2010a). It
seems plausible that cognitive ability is associated with
memory for details (e.g., including the source of the
information). If information is less accurately stored,
it may be more susceptible for misinformation because
the correct information cannot be remembered. Cognitive
ability scores of the current sample were lying within
the average range (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1992), which
suggests that relatively small differences in cognitive
ability affect susceptibility for the misinformation effect.
Similar results have been shown in studies on suggesti-
bility in children, although the association ceased to exist
in above-average levels of cognitive ability (Gignac &
Powell, 2006). Future studies may investigate the relation
in a range of cognitive ability levels and may elucidate the
underlying process.
Several limitations of the current study should be
considered before definite conclusions can be made. First,
the main limitation is that the misinformation effect was
based on a single item on a questionnaire. It remains
unclear whether participants really remembered the event,
or perhaps misunderstood the question. They may also
have confused the event with an actual attack during
prior deployments, although this is unlikely because
participants without prior deployments were more prone
to the misinformation effect, and they did not report
the event at the post-test. More detailed questions may
address this issue in futurestudies. Second, becausewedid
not include a control group that did not receive mis-
information, we cannot exclude that changes in report of
the fictional event may reflect ‘‘general’’ increased recall
over time (e.g., Engelhard, van den Hout, & McNally,
2008; King et al., 2000; Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, &
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations
12 34 M (SD) Range
1. Misinformation effect No (n 158) Yes (n 55)
2. PSS-H .09 1.68 (2.03) 2.11 (2.18) 0 11
3. PTES .31* .21* 13.30 (4.43) 16.64 (4.85) 0 24
4. Raven  .26* .02  .18* 50.07 (5.28) 46.62 (6.22) 33 60
5. EPQ-N .02 .39* .06  .02 3.29 (3.42) 3.44 (3.73) 0 16
Note. PSS-H Posttraumatic Symptom Scale*hyperarousal subscale; PTES Potentially Traumatizing Events Scale; Raven Standard
Progressive Matrices; EPQ-N Eysenck Personality Questionnaire*neuroticism scale. The number of participants was smaller for the
variable Raven (no 134, yes 42).
*pB.05.
Table 2. Logistic regression analyses predicting the
misinformation effect
Model B (SE) Wald p OR (95% CI)
PSS-H  0.07 (.10) 0.49 .49 0.93 (0.76 1.14)
PTES 0.12 (.05) 7.05 .01 1.13 (1.03 1.24)
PSS-H PTES
interaction
0.06 (.03) 4.64 .03 1.06 (1.01 1.12)
Raven  0.10 (.03) 8.71 B.01 0.91 (0.85 0.97)
Note. PSS-H Posttraumatic Symptom Scale*hyperarousal
subscale; PTES Potentially Traumatizing Events Scale; Raven 
Standard Progressive Matrices; EPQ-N Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire*neuroticism scale.
Fig. 1. Plotted PSS-H PTES interaction, with separate
lines representing the percentiles of PSS-H, and the prob-
ability of the misinformation effect at the Y-axis.
Misinformation effect
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stressors ranged from 2 to 19% with an average of 10%,
so it seems unlikely that our results could be explained
by a general increase in recall. Third, other poten-
tial predictors of the misinformation effect, such as
individual differences in vividness of mental imagery
(e.g., fantasy proneness and hypnotisability; Barnier &
McConkey, 1992; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Jelicic et al.,
2006) were not included. Fourth, the arousal measure
related to arousal over the past month, and arousal at
time of encoding the misinformation was not included.
Nonetheless, one might expect a substantial correla-
tion between arousal over the past month and state
arousal, as has been found for state and trait anxiety
(e.g., Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994). Fifth, the Cronbach’s
alpha of the PSS subscales was rather low, since values
of .70 .95 are considered as acceptable. This may be due
to the small number of items in this subscale. Sixth,
behavioral effects of the misinformation were not as-
sessed. It seems unlikely that the current mild manipula-
tion resulted in behavioral effects. However, there is
evidence that actual behavior may be affected by stronger
manipulation, that is, when participants are convinced
that the fictional event happened to them. One study
(Geraerts et al., 2008) found that participants who
believed the false suggestion that they had gotten ill
as a child after eating egg salad, avoided subsequent
consumption of egg salad.
Despite these limitations, the findings suggest that
the misinformation effect may have long-term effects
outside of the laboratory. With respect to clinical impli-
cations, this study may add to the awareness about the
malleability of memory. In line with the body of
literature on memory malleability, it is important for
clinicians to understand that memory for a potentially
traumatic event is not immutable (see also Engelhard,
van den Hout, & McNally, 2008). New information,
from whatever source, can be incorporated into existing
memories and can change the way people remember
events. Especially individuals with lower cognitive ability,
high arousal at the time of encoding the information
and more related experiences may be prone to the
misinformation effect.
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